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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Chad Ritchie appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of aggravated
assault on law enforcement personnel and one count of driving without obtaining a
driver's license, and the finding that he is a persistent violator. On appeal, Mr. Ritchie
asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for driving without
obtaining a driver's license and the persistent violator enhancement. Additionally, he
asserts that the district court erred when it relied on its own memory to find Mr. Ritchie
to be a persistent violator.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ritchie was charged by Amended Information with two counts of aggravated
assault on law enforcement personnel and one count of driving without obtaining a
driver's license. (R., pp.59-60.) In an Information Part" Mr. Ritchie was alleged to be a
persistent violator. (R., pp.55-56.)
The matter proceeded to a jury trial on the three criminal charges. As relevant to
this appeal, the State presented evidence that, at approximately 11 :30 p.m. on
1

August 20, 2011, Mr. Ritchie drove a motor vehicle on a road open to the public within
the State of Idaho.

(Tr., p.211, L.25 - p.213, L.10, p.218, L.13 - p.219, L.3, p.287,

L.287, L.25 - p.289, L.17.)

The State presented further evidence that at "around

midnight" on August 20, 2011, the vehicle involved in this incident was discovered by
Richard Hernandez, abandoned in his front yard.

(Tr., p.332, L.22 - p.333, L.2.)

Mr. Hernandez lives three blocks from the location where the 11 :30 p.m. driving incident
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occurred. (Tr., p.263, L.17 - p.264, L.9.) The State also presented evidence, through
Karen Schoen hut, an employee of the Idaho Transportation Department, concerning the
status of Mr. Ritchie's driving privileges the day after the incident date contained in the
Information.

On direct examination of Ms. Schoen hut, the State asked, "[o]n

August 21 st of 2011, can you tell me whether or not Chad Stuart Ritchie had a valid
driver's license?"

Ms. Schoehnut responded, "[n]o, he did not."

(emphasis added).)

(Tr., p.421 , LS.5-8

The State presented no evidence concerning the status of

Mr. Ritchie's driving privileges on August 20, 2011. (See generally Tr.; see also State's
Exhibit Nos. 1-16, 18-19. 2) Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Ritchie guilty of both counts of
aggravated assault on law enforcement personnel and driving without obtaining a
driver'S license. (Tr., p.507, Ls.3-17.)
Mr. Ritchie waived his right to a jury trial on the persistent violator enhancement,
electing to have a court trial on the issue. (Tr., p.497, L.13 - p.499, L.2.) The only
evidence that the State offered during the court trial on the persistent violator
enhancement were the two judgments of conviction. (Tr., p.512, L.24 - p.515, L.13.)
Furthermore, at no time during the preceding jury trial was there testimony or other
evidence establishing Mr. Ritchie's date of birth, Social Security Number, or other
indicia of identity other than his name. (See generally Tr.; see also State's Exhibit Nos.
1-16 and 18-19.) In finding Mr. Ritchie to be a persistent violator, the district court relied
on the fact that the name and date of birth contained in the Information in this case

At trial, the defense contended that Mr. Ritchie was not the driver. For purposes of
this claim, whether he was the driver is irrelevant.
2 One of the documents contained in the appellate record, labeled State's Exhibit No.
17, a packet of information concerning Mr. Ritchie's driving status, was never admitted
into evidence. (Tr., p.422, Ls.14-17; R., p.126.)
1

2

matched the name and date of birth contained in the two judgments of conviction.
Specifically, the district court reasoned,
So, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable doubt [with respect to State's
Exhibit No. 18], based on recognizing my own documents, my own file, my
own signature, that the defendant, who the Court does have some
recollection of, albeit it's been some years, has the same Social Security
number, and the same date of birth that is contained in the - the - not only
the information, but the Information Part II.
With respect to the documents contained in State's Exhibit No. 19, from
my - which was handled by my former colleague, Judge [sic] Joel Horton,
I recognize his handwriting. I've reviewed all the documents.
I am convinced by the date of birth, and by the Social Security number,
and the fact that the name is an exact match, that that is - that it has also
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has a second
prior felony conviction.
In other words, this Court had adjudicated the first one, the first prior
felony; my former colleague, Judge [sic] Horton, did the second one, or
adjudicated the second one. And I am persuaded, therefore, that the
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the
two prior felonies that are the subject of the Information Part".
(Tr., p.517, L.1 0 - p.518, L.8 (emphases added).)
Ultimately, Mr. Ritchie was sentenced to concurrent, unified sentences of fifteen
years, with three years fixed, on each of the two aggravated assault charges,3 and a
concurrent ninety day jail sentence on the charge of driving without obtaining a driver's
license, with the district court retaining jurisdiction "for evaluative purposes." (Tr., p.541,
Ls.7-25.) Mr. Ritchie filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., p.119.)

3 Absent a persistent violator enhancement, the maximum possible sentence for the
charge of aggravated assault on law enforcement personnel is ten years in custody.
I.C. §§ 18-906 and 915(1 )(b).

3

ISSUES

1.

Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish Mr. Ritchie's guilt on the
charge of driving without obtaining a driver's license and the persistent
violator enhancement?

2.

Did the district court err when it relied on its own memory to find Mr. Ritchie to be
a persistent violator?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish Mr. Ritchie's Guilt On The
Charge Of Driving Without Obtaining A Driver's License And The Persistent Violator
Enhancement
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Mr. Ritchie asserts that the evidence presented was insufficient to

establish Mr. Ritchie's guilt on the charge of driving without obtaining a driver's license
and the persistent violator enhancement. With respect to the charge of driving without
obtaining a driver's license, the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict
because the State failed to adduce evidence as to Mr. Ritchie's driver's license status
on the date he was seen driving, August 20, 2011.

As for the persistent violator

enhancement, the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's finding
because the State failed to produce any evidence as to Mr. Ritchie's date of birth or
Social Security Number, such that the prior judgments of conviction could be linked to
Mr. Ritchie.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for an appellate court regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain a conviction is set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals noted,
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict.

5

Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Batt v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586
(1996)).
A verdict cannot be the result of speculation or conjecture. See Ryan v. Beisner,
123 Idaho 42,46 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture.")
(citing Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 652 (1968)); Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 344 (1933) (Jury's verdict cannot rest "upon mere
speculation and conjecture"); United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 7 (2 Cir. 1996) ("[A]
conviction cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture."); United States

V.

Pettigrew,

77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5 th Cir. 1996) ("[A] verdict may not rest on mere suspicion,
speculation, or conjecture .... "); United States

V.

Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10 th Cir. 1995)

("We cannot permit speculation to substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even though rational jurors may believe in the likelihood of the defendant's guilt, as they
probably did in this case, they may not convict on that belief alone."); United States

V.

Diggs, 527 F.2d 509, 513 (8 th Cir. 1975) ("[A] jury is not justified in convicting a
defendant on the basis of mere suspicion, speculation or conjecture."); United States v.
Bethea, 442 F.2d 790, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[T]he trial judge should not allow the case
to go to the jury if the evidence is such as to permit the jury to merely conjecture or
speculate as to defendant's guilt."); Karchmer

V.

United States, 61 F.2d 623 (7 th Cir.

1932) ("A verdict which finds its only support in conjecture and speculation cannot
stand.").
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C.

The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish Mr. Ritchie's Guilt On The
Charge Of Driving Without Obtaining A Driver's License
Mr. Ritchie was charged, inter alia, with driving without obtaining a driver's

license, in violation of Idaho Code § 49-301, alleged to have been committed as follows:
That the Defendant, CHAD STUART RITCHIE, on or about the 20th day
of August 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did operate a motor
vehicle, to-wit: a 2009 Hyundai, at or about the 3800 block of Osage,
without a valid driver's license.
(R., p.59 (emphasis added).)
At trial, the State presented evidence that, at approximately 11 :30 p.m. on
August 20, 2011, Mr. Ritchie drove a motor vehicle on a road open to the public within
the State of Idaho.

(Tr., p.211, L.25 - p.213, L.10, p.218, L.13 - p.219, L.3, p.287,

L.287, L.25 - p.289, L.17.) The State presented further evidence that "around midnight"
on August 20, 2011, the vehicle involved in this incident was discovered by Richard
Hernandez, abandoned in his front yard. (Tr., p.332, L.22 - p.333, L.2.) Mr. Hernandez
lives three blocks from the location where the incident was alleged to have occurred.
(Tr., p.263, L.17 - p.264, L.9.)

The State also presented evidence, through Karen

Schoen hut, an employee of the Idaho Transportation Department, concerning the status
of Mr. Ritchie's driving privileges the day after the incident. On direct examination of
Ms. Schoenhut, the State asked, "[o]n August 21st of 2011, can you tell me whether or
not Chad Stuart Ritchie had a valid driver's license?" Ms. Schoehnut responded, "[n]o,
he did not." (Tr., p.421 , LS.5-8 (emphasis added).) The State presented no evidence
concerning the status of Mr. Ritchie's driving privileges on August 20, 2011.
general/yTr.; see also State's Exhibit Nos. 1-16,18-19.)
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(See

Mr. Ritchie anticipates that the State will argue that Idaho Code § 19-1414 allows
the State to prove that the incident occurred "on or about" any date within the statute of
limitation. As such, he will address this argument preemptively.
Idaho Code § 19-1414 provides: "The precise time at which the offense was
committed need not be stated in the indictment; but it may be alleged to have been
committed at any time before the finding thereof, except where the time is a material
ingredient in the offense." I.C. § 19-1414. Idaho appellate courts have concluded that
many statutes do not require, as a material element, proof of the time at which the crime
was committed. See State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124 (1968) (burglary); State v. Rogers,
48 Idaho 567 (1929) (rape); State v. Taylor, 118 Idaho 450 (Ct. App. 1990) (sexual
offenses against children).

Time can become material under certain circumstances

though. See State v. Tidyman, 635 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) ("Time is a
material element if the act charged is a crime if committed at one time but not if
committed at another.");

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "the precise date

need not be proved except in cases where it is the essence of the offense." State v.
Larsen, 76 Idaho 528,531 (1955) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Mr. Ritchie asserts that, given the nature of the offense charged and the facts of
his case, time is either a material element of the crime of driving without obtaining a
driver's license or is the essence of the offense.

First, the offense can only be

committed if, at the time the person was operating a motor vehicle, he or she lacked
driving privileges. I.C. § 49-301 (1) ("No person, except those expressly exempted by
the provisions of this chapter, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway unless the
person has a current and valid Idaho driver's license.") (emphasis added). Obviously, it
would not be a violation of the statute to drive the day before one's driving privileges
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were invalidated or immediately after they were reinstated.

Along similar lines, the

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has provided an example of one offense for which time
is a material element: a Texas statute criminalizing the sale of liquor on New Year's
Day.

Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d 683, 686 nA (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Tex.

Alcoholic Beverage Code § 105.101).
Idaho appellate decisions concerning license status offenses show that in such
cases one question that arises is whether, on a certain date, a person's driving
privileges were valid.

See State v. Matalamaki, 139 Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 2003)

(affirming conviction for lesser-included offense of driving with an invalid license, rather
than driving without privileges, when evidence showed that suspension period had
ended but license had not been reinstated at the time of the offense); State v. Clifford,
130 Idaho 259, 262 (Ct. App. 1997) ("When Clifford exceeded the permission granted
by the magistrate, then Clifford was not driving without a valid license, he was driving
without any privileges whatsoever because the period had not yet expired during which

his driving privileges had been suspended.") (emphasis added). Given the nature of the
offense, Mr. Ritchie submits that time is material to the charge of driving without
obtaining a driver's license insofar as the State must establish that, at the time of
driving, he or she does not have driving privileges.
In Mr. Ritchie's case, the State established that he drove on August 20, 2011,
and established that he had no driving privileges on August 21, 2011. In doing so, the
State failed to produce any evidence that Mr. Ritchie lacked driving privileges at the
time that he drove a motor vehicle. As such, the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury's finding of guilt. Had the State's evidence established that Mr. Ritchie did not
have a valid license during a time period inclusive of the date of the offense charged,
9

there could be no legitimate argument that time is material to the charge; however, such
is not the case here. For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ritchie respectfully requests
that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction as to count III, and remand this matter
for entry of a judgment of acquittal on that count.

D.

The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish That Mr. Ritchie Was A
Persistent Violator
Under Idaho's persistent violator law, a person convicted of a felony who has two

prior felony convictions faces a minimum sentence of five years, with a maximum
possible sentence of life imprisonment.

I.C. § 19-2514.

The State must plead the

persistent violator enhancement in the indictment or information, and must prove the
identity of the defendant as the person named in the prior convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413,416 (Ct. App. 2003). When the
State produces nothing more than a certified copy of a judgment of conviction
containing the same name as the defendant, the evidence is insufficient to support a
persistent violator finding. State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880 (Ct. App. 1982). A
judgment of conviction, when accompanied by mug shots and a fingerprint card, is
sufficient to support such a finding. Id. Testimony that the name and date of birth of the
defendant are the same as those on the judgments of conviction and that the prior
convictions are from the same county and for the same offense is also sufficient.
State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170 (Ct. App. 2010).
In Mr. Ritchie's case, the only evidence that the State offered during the court
trial on the persistent violator enhancement were the two prior judgments of conviction.
(Tr., p.512, L.24 - p.515, L.13.) Furthermore, at no time during the preceding jury trial
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was there testimony or other evidence establishing Mr. Ritchie's date of birth or Social
Security Number. (See general/yTr.; see also State's Exhibit Nos. 1-16 and 18-19.)
In finding Mr. Ritchie to be a persistent violator, the district court relied on the fact
that the name and date of birth contained in the Information in this case matched the
name and date of birth contained in the judgments of conviction.

Specifically, the

district court reasoned,
So, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable doubt [with respect to State's
Exhibit No. 18], based on recognizing my own documents, my own file, my
own signature, that the defendant, who the Court does have some
recollection of, albeit it's been some years, has the same Social Security
number, and the same date of birth that is contained in the - the - not only
the information, but the Information Part II.
With respect to the documents contained in State's Exhibit No. 19, from
my - which was handled by my former colleague, Judge [sic] Joel Horton,
I recognize his handwriting. I've reviewed all the documents.
I am convinced by the date of birth, and by the Social Security number,
and the fact that the name is an exact match, that that is - that it has also
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has a second
prior felony conviction.
In other words, this Court had adjudicated the first one, the first prior
felony; my former colleague, Judge [sic] Horton, did the second one, or
adjudicated the second one. And I am persuaded, therefore, that the
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the
two prior felonies that are the subject of the Information Part II.
(Tr., p.517, L.10 - p.518, L.8 (emphases added).)
The district court's reliance on information contained in the charging instrument in
this case, which was not evidence, to establish that Mr. Ritchie was a persistent violator
was improper and without support in the law. See State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,
910 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Official suspicion, indictment, or continued custody are not
grounds for a conviction.") (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)); see
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also Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 102 ("The [Information] [Indictment] [Complaint] is
simply a description of the charge; it is not evidence.") (brackets in original).
Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Ritchie was the
person named in the prior judgments of conviction, the evidence in the record is
insufficient to establish the persistent violator enhancement.

As such, Mr. Ritchie

respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator finding, and remand
this matter to the district court for entry of a finding that the enhancement was not
proven and for resentencing without enhancement.

II.
The District Court Was A Witness, And Its Memory Of Matters Outside Of The Record
Should Not Have Been Used To Support Its Findings
The district court acted as a witness in this case when it relied on its own
memory of prior dealings with Mr. Ritchie in concluding that he was the person named
in one of the judgments of conviction and thereby finding him to be a persistent violator.
The persistent violator finding must be reversed because it was made by a judge who
acted as a witness.
The district court relied on its own memory as the sentencing judge for one of the
prior felony convictions in finding that the persistent violator enhancement had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, discussing Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 18,
the district court reasoned,
So, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, based on recognizing my
own documents, my own file, my own signature, that the defendant, who
the Court does have some recollection of, albeit it's been some years, has
the same Social Security number, and the same date of birth that is
contained in the - the - not only the information, but the Information Part
II.
(Tr., p.517, LS.10-16 (emphasis added).)

12

Idaho Rule of Evidence 605 provides, "The judge presiding at the trial may not
testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the
point." I.R.E. 605. Although the district court did not testify in the traditional sense, it
engaged in the functional equivalent of testifying when it explained that it was relying on
its own memory in order to find that the State had met its burden of establishing
Mr. Ritchie's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Doing so was improper, and should
result in the reversal of the district court's finding that Mr. Ritchie was a persistent
violator.
Because the district court acted in violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 605,
Mr. Ritchie respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator finding,
and remand this matter for a new trial on the persistent violator enhancement before a
judge who is not a witness to the underlying allegations. 4

Obviously, if this Court grants the more complete relief requested in Part I, this claim
will be moot.
4

13

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ritchie respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for entry of judgments of
acquittal on the charge of driving without obtaining a driver's license and the persistent
violator enhancement and for resentencing on the charges of aggravated assault on
certain law enforcement personnel. In the alternative, he respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the persistent violator enhancement, and remand this matter for a new trial
on the persistent violator enhancement before a judge who is not a witness to the
underlying allegations.
DATED this 30 th day of October, 2012.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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